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Abstract: Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE) is considered to be one of the main achievements that 
the requirements of the Requirements Engineering field has produced since its inception. Several GORE 
methods were designed in the last twenty years in both research and industry. Curiously, GORE methods 
seem to have emerged out of nowhere in the early 1990s, the concept of Goal appearing as a natural element 
in explaining human and organizational behaviour. We have found no theoretical or philosophical work that 
explicitly link GORE to an underlying organizational model.  In this paper, we show that most GORE 
methods are implicitly based on the goal-seeking, decision making organizational model. We argue that 
there are other organizational models that may better explain human behaviour, albeit at the expense of 
more complex models. We present one such alternative model that explains individual and organizational 
survival through continuous regulation. We give our point of view of the changes needed in GORE methods 
to support this alternative view through the use of maintenance goals and beliefs. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the 25 years or so since the advent of 
requirements engineering (RE) research as an 
academic discipline, its flagship methods have been 
the Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering 
(GORE). The GORE methods have been lauded as 
one of the main achievement of the RE community, 
especially in its first 15 years of existence (van 
Lamsweerde, 2001), (Mylopoulos, Kolp and Castro, 
2006). GORE is still a very active field of research 
with dedicated workshops and conference tracks 
(e.g. the i* International workshop series, 
International Workshop on Requirements, Intentions 
and Goals in Conceptual Modeling).  
In RE practice, GORE methods developed in 
research have had less influence but they are 
matched by goal-oriented methods that were created 
by RE practitioners, e.g. Goal-Oriented Use Cases 
(Cockburn, 2001), Essential Use Cases (Constantine, 
1995). In this paper we designate all these methods 
as GORE, whether they have emerged from research 
or from practice. 
The emergence of GORE methods has coincided 
with a less software centric view of requirements. 
RE has evolved out of software specification 
methods by capturing more and more of the 
environment of the envisioned software system 
(Nuseibeh and Easterbrook, 2000), i.e. the 
composite system (van Lamsweerde, 2001). The 
GORE movement has been based on the 
understanding that goals justify and explain 
requirements that are assigned to agents in the 
composite system (software system and its 
environment), and that they help detecting and 
resolving conflicts among different stakeholder 
viewpoints (Dardenne, van Lamsweerde and Fickas, 
1993). In GORE methods and subsequently in RE, it 
has been assumed that the behaviour of the 
stakeholders in the environment of the software 
system is predominantly goal-oriented, see for 
example (Loucopoulos and Kavakli, 1995), 
(Nuseibeh and Easterbrook, 2000). 
There has been little debate concerning the 
epistemological roots of GORE methods (for an 
exception, see our own work (Regev and Wegmann, 
2005)). Very few RE researchers have challenged 
this assumption. The few papers that have discussed 
 problems with GORE methods have sought to 
supplement them with more artefacts, such as 
subject matters (Zave and Jackson, 1997) and 
scenarios (Rolland, Souveyet and Ben Achour, 
1998).  
For Nuseibeh and Easterbrook (Nuseibeh and 
Easterbrook, 2000) there are several types of RE 
depending on the end product that is envisioned. 
They give the following examples: RE for 
information systems, RE for embedded control 
systems and RE for generic services e.g. networking 
and operating systems. In this classification our 
discussion applies mostly to RE for information 
systems. In this type of RE, the composite system is 
the organization that the envisioned computer-based 
system serves. Nuseibeh and Easterbrook further 
state that the context of most RE and software 
activities is in this field of information systems 
development. Hence our discussion is applicable to 
many RE projects. We hope that readers interested 
in other types of RE will benefit from this discussion 
as well. 
We take Gause and Weinberg’s view that RE is 
about discovering what is desired (Gause and 
Weinberg, 1989). In this paper, we show that what 
people desire has more to do with the way they 
regulate their affairs than with the goals they seem to 
pursue. We base our proposal mostly on Vickers 
concept of Appreciative System (Vickers, 1968), 
(Vickers, 1987), (Regev, Hayard and Wegmann, 
2011) and show that goals are only the visible part 
of the way individuals and organizations regulate 
their relationships in order to survive. We also show 
that GORE methods have most of the necessary 
constructs to model this behaviour, e.g. maintenance 
goals and beliefs. We advocate a more systematic 
use of and widespread use of these concepts for 
better understanding regulation.  
We begin by reviewing the GORE research 
(Section 2). We then introduce the regulation 
organizational model and show that it can be used as 
the underlying mechanism of which goal-oriented 
behaviour is but the visible part (Section 3). We 
identify some of the shortcomings of GORE 
methods and propose remedies based on the 
regulation-oriented view (Section 4). We review 
some related work in Section 5. 
2 AN OVERVIEW OF GORE 
METHODS 
GORE methods use the concept of Goal as the main 
construct for defining requirements. The first papers 
linking goals and requirements date to the beginning 
of the RE discipline, e.g. (Dubois, 1989), (Robinson, 
1989), (Dardenne, Fickas and van Lamsweerde, 
1991). The link with the concept of goal seems to 
have emerged naturally from research into software 
specification e.g. (Robinson, 1989) that relied on 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) artefacts, e.g. (Nilsson, 
1971). Hence, most GORE methods use a 
vocabulary inherited from Artificial Intelligence, 
e.g. goals, agents, roles, objectives, constraints, and 
obstacles. 
Many GORE methods have been defined over 
the years. The most prominent are: KAOS, 
GBRAM (Anton, 1996), i* (Yu, 1997), GRL (ITU-
T, 2008), TROPOS (Mylopoulos, Kolp and Castro, 
2001), ESPRIT CREWS (Rolland et al., 1998), and 
Goal-oriented Use Case (Cockburn, 2001). 
Numerous goal types have been defined in these 
methods. Following is a very partial list of goal 
types: Achievement, maintenance, softgoal, 
feedback, satisfaction, etc. 
Very quickly goals have become a central 
concept in RE. Zave and Jackson, for example, offer 
the following definition, “Requirements Engineering 
is about the satisfaction of goals” (Zave and Jackson, 
1997). The call for papers of the Requirements 
Engineering conference series also strongly links 
requirements and goals, e.g. Requirements 
Engineering Conference 2004 (RE04): 
Requirements Engineering (RE) is the branch of 
systems engineering concerned with the goals, 
desired properties and constraints of complex 
systems, ranging from embedded software 
systems and software-based products to large 
enterprise and socio-technical systems that 
involve software systems, organisations and 
people. 
The focus on goals is understandable, not only 
because of the AI roots of GORE methods, but also 
because it relates with the goal-seeking 
organizational model prevalent in the neighbouring 
discipline of Information System (Checkland and 
Holwell, 1998). Many GORE methods take for 
granted this goal-seeking model. Modelling the 
organization, through Enterprise modelling, for 
example, is assumed to include goals, e.g. 
(Loucopoulos and Kavakli, 1995): “Enterprise 
modelling is about describing, in some formal way, 
a social system with its agents, work roles, goals, 
responsibilities and the like.” (Nuseibeh and 
Easterbrook, 2000): “Enterprise modelling and 
analysis deals with understanding an organisation’s 
structure; the business rules that affect its operation; 
the goals, tasks and responsibilities of its constituent 
members; and the data that it needs, generates and 
manipulates.” 
It is thus assumed that high-level enterprise goals 
can be gradually refined into requirements that can 
 be assigned to the envisioned system (Dardenne et 
al., 1993), (Nuseibeh and Easterbrook, 2000). This 
refinement is most often done with the help of 
and/or goal trees inherited from (Nilsson, 1971). 
Several RE researchers have reported problems 
with this assumption, e.g. (Anton, 1996), (Zave and 
Jackson, 1997), (Rolland et al., 1998), stating that 
goal discovery and goal refinement are not 
straightforward tasks, that enterprise goals are not 
necessarily a good starting point for goal refinement 
and that goal abstraction may lead to unrealistic or 
unwanted alternatives. The proposed remedies were 
to bound goal abstraction and refinement with the 
subject matter of the organization (Zave and 
Jackson, 1997), to use interview transcripts and 
organizational documents for goal discovery (Anton, 
1996) and to use scenarios and goals reasoning 
together so that they inform one another (Rolland et 
al., 1998). 
There have been surprisingly few attempts to 
link GORE to other organizational viewpoints, the 
only exception known to us is our own previous 
work (Regev and Wegmann, 2005). This is 
surprising because in their suggested roadmap for 
RE, Nuseibeh and Easterbrook (2000) suggest that, 
“RE is a multi-disciplinary, human-centred process.” 
They further state that (Nuseibeh and Easterbrook, 
2000), 
RE needs to be sensitive to how people perceive 
and understand the world around them, how they 
interact, and how the sociology of the workplace 
affects their actions. RE draws on the cognitive 
and social sciences to provide both theoretical 
grounding and practical techniques for eliciting 
and modelling requirements 
Nuseibeh and Easterbrook (2000) list the 
following disciplines as part of RE: Cognitive 
psychology, anthropology, sociology and linguistics. 
They proceed to prescribe that (Nuseibeh and 
Easterbrook, 2000):  
There is an important philosophical element in 
RE. RE is concerned with interpreting and 
understanding stakeholder terminology, 
concepts, viewpoints and goals. Hence, RE must 
concern itself with an understanding of beliefs of 
stakeholders (epistemology), the question of 
what is observable in the world 
(phenomenology), and the question of what can 
be agreed on as objectively true (ontology). Such 
issues become important whenever one wishes to 
talk about validating requirements, especially 
where stakeholders may have divergent goals 
and incompatible belief systems. 
While prescribing the need to incorporate 
different epistemological, phenomenological and 
ontological systems, Nuseibeh and Easterbrook 
perpetuate the already prevalent organizational 
model in RE, namely goal achievement by repeating 
the main assumption of GORE methods about goal 
achievement. 
By focusing on goal achievement, GORE 
methods have set aside all these aspects of 
epistemology and phenomenology and have applied 
a unique ontology supposed to be universal. In the 
recent years, KAOS and more so i* have become the 
main GORE methods with dozens of research papers 
devoted to them. Most of these are papers that use 
these methods in specific areas or that propose 
extensions to them. i* has been incorporated into the 
URN ITU-T standard (ITU-T, 2008) with seemingly 
hardly a questioning of its assumptions. Recently, a 
well received study of the i* graphical notation was 
published (Moody, Heymans and Matulevičius, 
2009), noting that major improvement is needed in 
order to make i* user friendly. The study however 
remained at the graphical level and did not 
investigate the epistemological or ontological 
aspects of i*. 
Sutcliffe and Maiden (1993) proposed a notable 
kind of goal in a paper that seems to have received 
little attention by GORE researchers. They proposed 
6 classes of goals. One of the classes is called 
“feedback goals.” They describe these goals as 
maintaining a desired state with a related tolerance 
range, spawning corrective actions when the state is 
considered to be outside the tolerance range 
(Sutcliffe and Maiden, 1993). Curiously, this class 
of goals has not been picked up by subsequent 
GORE research. We have ourselves added feedback 
into GORE research about 10 years later (Regev and 
Wegmann, 2004), (Regev and Wegmann, 2005) 
without noticing the significance of Sutcliffe and 
Maiden’s feedback goal class at the time.  
In the following section we propose an 
epistemological view for GORE methods that may 
help to alleviate some of their shortcomings. This 
view is an extension of our previous work (Regev 
and Wegmann, 2005). To clarify our discussion, we 
use Zave and Jackson’s example of the development 
of a turnstile for a zoo (Zave and Jackson, 1997) as a 
running example. We reproduce their problem 
description here verbatim for the clarity of the 
discussion (Zave and Jackson 1997): 
 Requirements engineering is about the 
satisfaction of goals [..]. But goals by themselves 
do not make a good starting point for 
requirements engineering. To see why, consider 
a project to develop a computer-controlled 
turnstile guarding the entrance to a zoo [..]. 
 If the engineers are told that the goal of the 
system is to deny entrance to people who have 
not paid the admission charge, they may decide 
that the goal has been stated too narrowly. Is not 
the real goal to ensure the profitability of the 
zoo? Should they consider other ways of 
improving profits, such as cutting costs? What if 
there is more money to be made by closing the 
zoo and selling the land? And what is the goal of 
profit? If the goal of profit is the happiness of the 
zoo owner, would religion or devotion to family 
be more effective? Obviously there is something 
wrong here. Almost every goal is a subgoal with 
some higher purpose. Both engineering and 
religion are concerned with goal satisfaction; 
what distinguishes them is their subject matter. 
The engineers should be told, in addition to the 
goal, that the subject matter is the zoo entrance. 
This information should take the form of 
designations of phenomena observable at the zoo 
entrance, such as visitors, coins, and the action 
of entering the zoo. These designations 
circumscribe the area in which alternative goal 
satisfaction strategies can be considered, at the 
same time that they provide the basis for formal 
representation of requirements. 
3 SURVIVAL AND REGULATION 
AS THE SOURCE OF GOALS 
As we have seen, GORE methods seek to define the 
highest-level goals that are adequate for defining 
requirements for an envisioned system. Despite their 
important advancement, this is one aspect that the 
mainstream GORE methods (e.g. i*, KAOS) have 
not defined yet. So-called high-level goals are often 
described as strategic goals in GORE papers (see 
High-level goals entry in the previous section). It is 
therefore important to understand what is a strategic 
goal. If we define the strategic level as being geared 
toward the survival of the organization we have to 
define what survival means: We have shown 
elsewhere, e.g. (Regev and Wegmann, 2005), 
(Regev and Wegmann, 2009), that survival can be 
understood in terms of the maintenance of relatively 
stable states, often called norms, that an observer 
can use to identify an organization. The zoo, for 
example, maintains a large set of norms for its 
animals, employees, visitors, owners, animal rights 
activists etc. For the animals, it maintains a stable 
place in which to live, get fed and cared for, and 
maybe reproduce. For the visitors the zoo maintains 
a stable place where they can view animals while 
being certain that they are well cared for. The 
location of the zoo, its name, its layout, the animals 
it houses are all aspects that change very little over 
time. It is quite probable that the zoo you visited as a 
child still exists and you can visit it with your 
children or grandchildren. It is also quite probable 
that most of the animals and employees who were at 
the zoo when you were a child are no longer there. 
But the zoo is still there. Hence the zoo maintains its 
identity despite changes in all of its components 
(e.g. employees, suppliers, management, animals, 
visitors). 
Maintaining norms is a powerful motivator for 
action. The zoo’s management might want to 
maintain its image as a modern facility and therefore 
maintain the fit with the state of the art in visitor 
management and feel that it’s entrance system is not 
up to date and needs to be replaced. It may believe 
that manual entrance control is not efficient enough 
and that by cutting costs on entrance control, it could 
use the money thus saved to better maintain its 
animals’ health.  
To maintain its norms relatively stable doesn’t 
mean that the norms don’t change at all. 
Organizations that survive over the long run make 
changes to their norms but in a very controlled way.  
This means that changes must be controlled for the 
organization to maintain its identity for its 
stakeholders. Consider what may happen if the zoo 
changed its location or name twice a year or more 
often. Would it be still recognized by its visitor? 
Would its employees continue to work there? What 
if it changed its mission from a zoo to a theme park, 
to a museum etc.? But of course the zoo also 
changes its norms, it may add new kinds of animals, 
playgrounds, activities, partnerships with other 
likeminded organizations. By saying that its norms 
should not change too much, we are actually placing 
bounds on how much change is acceptable. 
Remember the tolerance range defined by Sutcliffe 
and Maiden for feedback goals (1993).  
What enables an organization to maintain and 
change its norms are the relationships it has with 
individuals and organizations, both inside and 
outside the organization. This is a consequence of 
the open system model of organizations (Regev and 
Wegmann, 2005), (Regev and Wegmann, 2009). 
These relationships must themselves be maintained 
within very specific bounds (norms) for the 
organization to be able to leverage them for 
maintaining other norms. Thus, the zoo needs a 
continuous flow of visitors to maintain its funding 
and it places very strict bounds on what the visitors 
can and cannot do. For starters, visitors must in most 
cases pay their admission. They may pay a bit less if 
they are part of specific classes of people (seniors, 
children group members). Some visitors may not 
pay at all if the zoo has a real reason to want them to 
 visit the zoo (e.g. VIPs, teachers accompanying a 
school class, very young children). Hence, there is a 
tolerance range for the admission price but it is not a 
wildly changing aspect. There are other bounds on 
what visitors are allowed to do in the zoo so that 
their presence will be beneficial for the zoo and not 
detrimental, e.g. it is probably forbidden to feed the 
animals outside of very controlled food dispensed by 
the zoo to specific animals, it is forbidden to 
mistreat animals etc. Visitors who do not conform to 
these bounds may be denied further admission to the 
zoo, despite the zoo’s willingness to have as many 
visitors as possible. Applying different price 
schemes and denying entrance are likely to be 
translated into goals for the turnstile. Understanding 
the norms and where they come from helps analysts 
to understand the goals expressed by the 
stakeholders and discover non-expressed goals as 
well. 
The study of the way norms are maintained 
stable is called regulation (or control). A feedback 
regulator (or controller), e.g. a thermostat, an 
automatic pilot, maintains a given state stable, e.g. 
temperature, course, by sensing the current state 
comparing it with the given state, and applying some 
action if the difference is above the tolerance level. 
Vickers (Vickers, 1968), (Vickers, 1987) proposed 
the concept of the appreciative system, by extending 
this model of a feedback regulation to human and 
organizational regulation. Vickers’s appreciative 
system has three components (Vickers, 1968), 
(Vickers, 1987), (Regev, Wegmann and Hayard, 
2011): Reality judgments, Value judgments and 
Action judgments. With reality judgments, some 
aspect of reality is singled out to be the study of 
attention. In value judgments, this reality judgment 
is matched to a category within which it is then 
compared to the norm (what ought to be). In Action 
judgment, some action might be taken to bring the 
reality judgment closer to the norm. The three 
judgments function as a complete system so that 
change to one of them requires change to the others. 
Hence, the way we view and judge the world affect 
our actions and our actions affect our view and 
judgments (Vickers, 1968), (Vickers, 1987).  
As we have seen before, the value judgment is 
done with some tolerance around the norm. In a 
simple automaton the information to be sensed, the 
norm and tolerances to be compared with and the 
kind of actions to be taken are all given by its 
designer. In an appreciative system, they are all 
subject to continuous change; nothing is set once 
and for all by a designer. Hence, an appreciative 
system creates its own dynamics, which an 
automaton does not. 
Whereas the appreciative system creates its own 
judgments, it is nevertheless a rather stable 
construct, i.e. it creates its own norms. Vickers calls 
these norms readiness. Hence an organization has a 
readiness (a tendency) to see things in certain ways, 
to value them in certain ways and to act in certain 
ways. All these are rather stable in time. It is often 
the role of the analyst to try and shake these 
readinesses. 
Linking the appreciative system and GORE 
aspects, we can see that maintenance goals can be an 
approximation of norms, beliefs can be an 
approximation of reality and value judgments, and 
achievement goals can be an approximation of 
action judgments.  
From this point of view, GORE methods have 
concentrated on the third stage, action judgments 
(achievement goals), and neglected the other two, 
norms (maintenance goals), and reality and value 
judgments (beliefs). This is easily understandable if 
we consider that actions judgments are much more 
visible than reality and value judgments.  
Because the three judgments of the appreciative 
system are interlocked, goals cannot be changed 
without changing the beliefs that justify them.  
4 IMPROVING GORE METHODS 
Based on the regulation view we proposed in the 
previous section, we identified a number of 
shortcomings common to most GORE methods. We 
explain them and provide pointers for addressing 
them. 
 
Maintenance is higher-level than achievement 
Although many types of goals have been defined in 
GORE methods, the most popular goal type has been 
and remains the achievement goals; a goal that is to 
be achieved once and for all. The next most popular 
goal type is the softgoal. Both KAOS and GBRAM 
have introduced the concept of maintenance goal, a 
goal that “is satisfied as long as its target condition 
remains true” (Anton and Potts, 1998). Maintenance 
goals have not received much attention and remains 
largely unused. This is particularly unfortunate 
because maintenance goals have been identified as 
“high-level goals with which achievement goals 
should comply” (Anton and Potts, 1998).  
As we have shown, the concept of maintenance 
goal is very useful to model norms. Consider some 
of the norms maintained by the zoo. A zoo just as 
any other organization is an organism that seeks 
some permanency and which takes actions to 
maintain this permanency. Thus, the zoo needs a 
continuous in-flow and out-flow of visitors, animals, 
feed, medicine, employees etc. without these flows 
the zoo may not survive. The zoo is likely to take 
 many actions to restore any one of these flows to the 
norm it depends on if the flow comes to be below a 
given tolerance level. These actions can be modelled 
as maintenance, sofgoals, feedback and achievement 
goals. 
If maintenance goals are augmented with 
tolerance levels (imported from feedback goals) they 
can be used to model norms.  
 
The concept of high-level goal 
While both why and how questions are encouraged 
by GORE methods, the how is much more prevalent 
in GORE publications. Most often, a so-called high-
level goal is postulated to be strategic for the 
organization under analysis and is refined into 
subgoals.  
For example, van Lamsweerde gives the 
following examples for “high-level, strategic 
concern”: “serve more passengers” for a train 
transportation system” and “provide ubiquitous cash 
service for an ATM network system.” (van 
Lamsweerde, 2001). It is not clear why these should 
be considered as high-level, strategic goals and how 
they can be satisfied. If the train transportation 
system serves a few more passengers, is this goal 
achieved? What will the system do next once this 
goal is achieved? What if this goal is never 
achieved? What would the ATM network system do 
once the ubiquitous cash service is provided? What 
are the criteria of achievement for a ubiquitous cash 
service? Looking closely at these goals, it becomes 
clear that they cannot be achieved once and for all 
but should be seen as maintenance goals, which are 
never fully satisfied. From the regulation viewpoint 
they therefore represent norms that may be 
considered essential for the survival of the system. 
Identifying the norms that are considered 
essential for survival helps solve the unacceptable 
goal alternatives identified by Zave and Jackson. 
Identifying these strategic norms places the 
appropriate bounds on what is acceptable and not 
acceptable. For the zoo, these norms are the result of 
the relationships it maintains, between animals, 
visitors, employees, veterinarians, investors, 
buildings, donors, etc. Hence, rather than limiting 
the field of investigation to the objects and actions 
observable at the zoo entrance, the turnstile can be 
seen as an essential artefact in this regulation of 
relationships, even those that are not immediately 
observable at the zoo entrance, which will expand 
the field of investigation without crossing into 
subjects such as selling the zoo or religious 
devotion. 
For example, asking what norms does the 
turnstile maintain may lead to answers such as that it 
regulates the in-flow of people, filtering between 
people who have the right to enter the zoo and those 
that don’t. Knowing more about the norms 
maintained by the rest of the zoo, we can infer more 
about current and possible future norms. It is clear 
that the turnstile cannot maintain the expected norm 
if the zoo is not protected from rogue entrance 
elsewhere. The zoo must maintain this protection 
(probably in the form of a fence). Knowing that 
people can enter and leave the zoo only through the 
turnstile, we can see that the turnstile can maintain 
the number of people presently inside the zoo, which 
can help maintain security norms (preventing 
overcrowding, helping to insure complete 
evacuation in case of emergency and at closing time 
(another norm). Knowing about new norms of 
potential visitors, the turnstile can be made to accept 
cash, credit card and smartphone payments. It can 
allow quick admission of groups (a norm). 
A more widespread use of maintenance goals as 
the highest-level goals that model an organization 
survival is therefore necessary. 
 
Goal refinement and goal abstraction 
All GORE methods place goals in a hierarchy. Goal 
refinement is used to identify lower-level goals by 
asking how a given goal is achieved. Goal 
abstraction is used to identify higher-level goals by 
asking why a given goal needs to be achieved. 
GORE methods have very good constructs for 
formalizing more or less predefined goals but goal 
discovery is still a challenge. Hence, despite 
arguments to the contrary (e.g. (van Lamsweerde, 
2001)), GORE publications often describe tools for 
goal refinement but very little goal abstraction. The 
problem may come from the difficulty in identifying 
the sought-out high-level goals.  
Both goal refinement and goal abstraction create 
a rather simplistic model of human and 
organizational behaviour.  
Consider goal abstraction, in Zave and Jackson’s 
(1997) example of the zoo turnstile, the engineers 
ask themselves why questions and come up with 
higher level goals and alternatives. This is not 
usually the way requirements are identified. The 
engineers are supposed to ask the zoo employees or 
owners why they need a turnstile. In our experience, 
asking stakeholders why they need some solution 
that they identified is as likely to lead to answers 
such as, “because I want this other thing” as to 
answers such as “because I believe this.” In the zoo 
example, asking the owners why they want to install 
a computer-controlled turnstile may yield answers 
such as: 
• We want to have a more efficient admission 
system. 
Or 
 • We believe that a computer-controlled 
turnstile will be more efficient than our 
manually controlled admission system. 
Or 
• The zoo in the neighbouring town recently 
installed a computer-controlled turnstile and 
are very happy with it. 
 
These answers can be translated into higher-level 
goals (i.e. improve efficiency, match the 
competition) but this would mask the issue that this 
is just the owners’ beliefs about their zoo. If these 
issues are captured as goals they are more likely to 
go unchallenged than if they are treated as beliefs. 
Goal refinement can equally be improved by the 
use of beliefs. Remember that goals and beliefs are 
co-dependent as a result of the interlocking of the 
three judgments that form the appreciative system. 
Consider asking the zoo owners how they would 
like to make their zoo more efficient. If they believe 
that the best way is to install a computer-controlled 
turnstile, they will ask for one. If they believe that 
cost cutting will yield better results, they will ask for 
cost cutting measures. If they think that both are 
needed, they will ask for both. Capturing the goal 
refinement as an and/or tree will result in the loss of 
these beliefs and more importantly in the 
opportunity to challenge them. For a more elaborate 
explanation of beliefs and their use in GORE 
methods, see (Regev and Wegmann, 2005). More 
research can be done on modelling reality and value 
judgments as beliefs. 
A more widespread use of maintenance goals in 
conjunction with achievement goals and beliefs can 
help in modelling regulation and may help to better 
understand requirements. A beginning of a solution 
is proposed in our previous work (Regev and 
Wegmann, 2004). 
5 RELATED WORK 
Several conceptual studies of GORE methods 
have been published over the years, e.g. (Kavakli, 
2002), (Kavakli and Loucopoulos, 2005). These 
studies assume a viewpoint from within the RE 
research paradigm. They do not ground their 
research in an external body of knowledge, which 
limits their explanatory power of goals. Moody et al. 
(2010) have studied the graphical language of i* and 
its fit with users’ understanding. We have proposed 
an explanation of goals based on General Systems 
Thinking and Vickers’s work in (Regev and 
Wegmann, 2005). 
Our work is similar in nature to Checkland and 
Holwell’s conceptual cleansing (1998) of the field of 
information systems. Checkland (Checkland and 
Scholes, 1990) has worked extensively to popularize 
Vickers’s work with Soft System Methodology 
(SSM). Ours is a very short description of Vickers’s 
appreciative system. More elaborate descriptions are 
available in Vickers’s writings (Vickers, 1968), 
(Vickers, 1987), and in (Checkland and Scholes, 
1990), (Checkland, 2005), (Regev et al., 2011). 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
RE is about understanding peoples’ desires and 
maybe designing some automated system to help 
them to obtain o maintain them. RE must therefore 
make the balance between what is desired and what 
is feasible. To understand what is desired, it is above 
all necessary to understand how people behave. 
GORE methods have made major contributions to 
the practice of RE but have modelled human and 
organizational behaviour in too simplified terms, 
mostly as goals to be achieved. In this paper, we 
have shown that goals can be seen as the visible part 
of regulation. Regulation models the way 
organizations (be they people or organizations) 
attempt to survive in a changing environment.  
Regulation results in the establishment of norms, 
stable states that define the identity and therefore the 
survival of an organization. A long lasting 
organization manages its internal and external 
relationships in a way that controls the changes to 
these norms but still allows them to change when 
needed. Looking at regulation rather than goals 
shifts the attention to the way people manage 
stability and change by managing relationships. 
To understand people’s desires it is important to 
analyse this more fundamental aspect of their 
behaviour, which is regulation rather than goals. RE 
has already defined most of the useful concepts 
needed for the study of regulation, e.g. maintenance 
goals, and beliefs. What is needed is a paradigm 
change from goals to regulation. This paradigm 
change will hopefully result in the more widespread 
use of these goal-oriented concepts.  
A useful stream of research with which to 
connect, is General Systems Thinking, which has 
most of the necessary constructs to understand 
regulation in all kinds of systems, e.g. (Weinberg, 
1975), (Weinberg and Weinberg, 1988), (Ashby, 
1956). Organizational Semiotics can also be useful 
because it is the study of norms in organizations 
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